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1. Introduction 
 
Modal metaphysics is one of the most fertile – I am tempted to say febrile – 
areas of research in contemporary philosophy. It is an area in which certain 
historical figures loom large, if only eponymously. Our talk of possible 
worlds is Leibnizian. David Lewis was Humean. Kit Fine is Aristotelian. 
Kant, however, tends merely to appear as a stalking horse for incautious 
conflations of the necessary and the a priori, of modal metaphysics with 
modal epistemology. 
 
Even within the Kant literature itself, it cannot be said that modal 
metaphysics has been a focal point of attention. There is, of course, an 
enormous amount of work dedicated in one way or another to Kant’s 
metaphysics and Kant on metaphysics. But in contrast to, say, the nature of 
transcendental idealism, the theory of space and time, and the treatments of 
causality and the self, Kant’s views on modality have been somewhat 
neglected. 
 
One might be forgiven for supposing, then, that all this is because Kant 
wasn’t much interested in the metaphysics of modality or that he didn’t have 
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anything much of interest to say about it. Kant’s Modal Metaphysics shows 
how wrong this would be on both counts. 
 
The book is a tour de force. In ten1 closely argued chapters that display both 
philosophical acumen and a consummate grasp of a wide range of Kant’s 
texts and their historical context, Nicholas Stang shows how a set of 
interconnected issues in modal metaphysics play an absolutely central role in 
Kant’s pre-Critical philosophy, in motivating the Critical turn, and finally in 
the Critical philosophy itself. The resulting narrative is rich in insight and 
compelling. Far from being an incautious conflation, the connections Kant 
draws in the Critical period between the metaphysics and epistemology of 
modality are deep, intricate, well-motivated, and – so it seems to me – 
worthy of serious philosophical attention. 
 
The book is organized into two parts of roughly equal length. Part I, 
comprising chapters 1-5, concerns Kant’s pre-Critical modal metaphysics. 
The focus of this part is the Only Possible Ground of Proof or Beweisgrund 
essay of 1763, but there is also substantial discussion of the Negative 
Magnitudes essay of the same year. Part II, comprising chapters 6-10, 
concerns Kant’s Critical modal metaphysics, from its announcement in 1781 
in the Critique of Pure Reason through its development in the Metaphysical 
Foundation of Natural Science of 1786 to its full maturity in the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment of 1790. The last section of Chapter 5 and the first half 
of Chapter 6 act as a kind of fulcrum, summarizing the pre-Critical view 
before tracing the transition to the Critical view via brief but illuminating 
accounts of the ‘Prize’ essay of 1764, the ‘Inaugural Dissertation’ of 1770, 
and the famous letter to Herz of 1772. 
 
This is a book of impressive scope, made all the more impressive by the fact 
that it thereby sacrifices nothing in quality. 
 
In this extended critical discussion, I will focus on one central issue from the 
first chapter of the book: Stang’s account of Kant’s doctrine that existence is 
not a real predicate. This issue sets the stage for much of what comes after 
and that is my excuse for focusing on it here. 
 
In §2 I outline some background. In §§3-4 I present and then elaborate on 
Stang’s interpretation of Kant’s view that existence is not a real predicate. 
For Stang, the question of whether existence is a real predicate amounts to 
 
1 There is substantial additional material online at https://sites.google.com/site/nickstang/. 
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the question: ‘could there be non-actual possibilia?’ (p.35).2 Kant’s view, 
according to Stang, is that there could not, and that the very notion of non-
actual or ‘mere’ possibilia is incoherent. In §5 I take a close look at Stang’s 
master argument that Kant’s Leibnizian predecessors are committed to the 
claim that existence is a real predicate, and thus to mere possibilia. I argue 
that it involves substantial logical commitments that the Leibnizian could 
reject. I also suggest that it is in danger of proving too much. In §6 I explore 
two closely related logical commitments that Stang’s reading implicitly 
imposes on Kant and I suggest that each can seem to involve Kant himself 
in commitment to mere possibilia. 
 
A note on methodology before we begin. I take my lead from Stang in 
employing contemporary tools to aid my investigation of the philosophical 
structure of Kant’s position. This is especially so in §§5-6, where I discuss 
universal (or inclusive) free logic and quantified modal logic in some detail. 
These tools are anachronistic, of course, but the questions they are used to 
investigate are remarkably close to those that are in dispute between Kant 
and the Leibnizians. As Stang says, ‘The question of possibilism – could 
there be non-actual possibilia? – can be formulated […] as the question: 
could there be a being that has essence but lacks existence?’ (p.35). This is a 
question that Kant and the Leibnizians could make perfect sense of, and the 
same will be true, under suitable formulations, of the questions I connect to 
it. For instance: whether logic itself should carry ontological commitment; 
whether it needs special modal operators to express metaphysical modality; 
whether every object exists necessarily and what the diﬀerence is between 
that claim and the claim that necessarily every object exists; whether there is 
a diﬀerence between wide scope, sentence negation on the one hand and 
narrow scope, predicate negation on the other; and, most fundamentally, 
what it is that metaphysically underpins the truth or falsity of our modal 
claims. 
 
One of my take-home points from this wonderful book is an appreciation of 
just how similar are the topics and dividing lines that move contemporary 
modal metaphysicians to those that moved the modal metaphysicians of the 
17th and 18th centuries. Another is how coherent and sophisticated Kant’s 
own view of these matters is, even by today’s lights. 
 
2 All unaccompanied page, section, and chapter references are to Stang (2016), except 
section references in bold, which refer to sections within the present text. References to 
Kant’s works are by volume and page number of the Academy Edition, except those to the 
Critique of Pure Reason, which take the standard A/B format. I follow the Cambridge 
translations of Kant with occasional minor changes. Details of the volumes used are given 
in the list of references.
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2. Logicism and Ontotheism 
 
Kant’s Modal Metaphysics opens with an account of the Leibnizian 
orthodoxy in modal metaphysics against which Kant sets himself in the pre-
Critical period. Stang calls this orthodoxy ‘logicism’.3 In a nutshell, logicism 
is the view that metaphysical (or ‘real’4) modality is nothing over and above 
logical modality, where – in the simplest propositional terms – a proposition 
is logically possible just in case it does not entail a contradiction and 
logically necessary just in case its negation does entail a contradiction. In 
particular, logicism holds that there are no logical possibilities that are not 
also metaphysical possibilities and no metaphysical necessities that are not 
also logical necessities. 
 
Logicist modal metaphysics makes modal epistemology relatively 
straightforward. Modal space is just logical space, hence our epistemic access 
to the latter is epistemic access to the former, and this is had via the 
conventional route of analyzing concepts and comprehending the logical 
relations that hold between them. In particular, logicism makes sense of 
how we can have a priori knowledge of metaphysical modality, since this 
kind of knowledge is just what conceptual analysis and logic provide: 
 
The domain of the possible, for Leibniz, Wolﬀ, and Baumgarten, is a 
logically structured domain of logically consistent concepts of possible 
objects, propositions about those possible objects, and their logical relations. 
By analyzing concepts into their more fundamental constituents, we gain 
insight into the logical structure of modal reality and attain a priori 
knowledge of possibility. (p.25) 
 
That logicism provides a relatively straightforward account of how we can 
have a priori knowledge of metaphysical modality will be especially 
important when it comes to understanding Kant’s motivation for the 
Critical turn. 
 
In the pre-Critical philosophy, Kant will distinguish metaphysical from 
logical modality. In thereby rejecting logicism, he deprives himself of its 
modal epistemology. On Stang’s narrative, it is in recognizing this deficit 
and working to develop a new account of how we can have a priori 
knowledge of metaphysical modality that Kant makes the Critical turn. The 
 
3 Not to be confused with the view that mathematics can be reduced to logic. As will 
become clear in a moment, it is also important that ‘logical’ here should be understood 
broadly, so as to also cover ‘analytic’ relations between non-logical concepts. 
4 To simplify the terminology, I use the Leibnizian/contemporary term rather than the 
Crusian/Kantian one throughout. 
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doctrine of transcendental idealism, the theory of intuition, and most 
generally the transformation of traditional ontology into transcendental 
philosophy and thus of first-order questions about objects into second-order 
questions about our representations of objects, are all elements in Kant’s 
response to this pressure. The guiding Critical question of how metaphysics 
is possible is a question about how we can have a priori knowledge in modal 
metaphysics. 
 
As I said, the narrative is compelling. In my view, it deserves a central place 
alongside other, more established narratives, for example that see the 
Critical philosophy as in large part a reaction to Hume.5 
 
But what kicks it all oﬀ? Why does Kant distinguish the metaphysical and 
logical modalities and reject logicism in the first place? After all, as Stang 
notes and as many before and after Kant have agreed, ‘logicism is a deeply 
plausible view about the metaphysics of modality’ (p.20). 
 
The answer – by equal parts obvious and too often overlooked in other 
narratives – is that it all comes down to God. 
 
Having outlined logicism in §§1.2-1.3, Stang proceeds to argue in §1.4 that, 
given the assumption of divine necessity – an assumption shared by both 
the pre-Critical Kant and the Leibnizians – logicism implies what Stang calls 
‘ontotheism’. Ontotheism is the view that ‘God exists in virtue of his 
essence’ (p.13). Arguing from logicism to ontotheism involves carefully 
drawing out a complex web of connections, first connecting logicism as 
expressed above to the more germane notions of demonstration and real 
definition and then connecting these notions to the notion of essence 
 
5 It would be a fascinating further project to explore how Stang’s narrative interacts with the 
Hume narrative, not least because they appear to be in tension with one another. On 
Stang’s account, one of the key problems that motivates the Critical turn, and which Kant 
tries to solve in the Transcendental Deduction, is that of how we can know a priori that it is 
really (metaphysically) possible that the categories are instantiated (Chapter 6). This seems 
to involve a ‘weak’ reading of the Deduction where its aim could be met without showing 
that the categories are in fact instantiated. Such a conclusion looks insuﬃcient as a response 
to Humean skepticism. Of course there are several moves Stang could make here, for 
instance to observe that his reading of the Deduction is only partial or that the anti-
Humean work is done elsewhere, perhaps in the Principles. But another interesting 
possibility is that showing how we can know a priori that it is really possible that the 
categories are instantiated already suﬃces to show that they are in fact instantiated, because 
objects cannot be really possibly categorial without being actually (and thus necessarily) 
categorial. For recent discussions of issues in this area, see the exchange between Landy 
(2017) and Gomes (2017b) in the present venue, as well as Gomes (2017a) and Gomes and 
Stephenson (2016). 
 6 
invoked by ontotheism. But the basic idea is familiar. Logicism holds that 
all necessities are logical necessities. So if it is necessary that God exists, then 
this must be a matter of the right kind of logical relation holding between 
the concept <God> and the concept <exists>. As Kant might later put it, the 
concept <God> would have to contain the concepts <exists>. 
 
As Stang observes (p.28), ontotheism is a view Kant rejects almost from the 
moment he starts publishing philosophy. In the Nova Dilucidatio of 1755 he 
writes: 
 
that there is something which has within itself the ground of its own 
existence […] is absurd […] I find, indeed, the view repeatedly expressed in 
the teachings of modern philosophers that God has the ground of His 
existence in Himself. For my part, I find myself unable to support this view 
[…] I know that appeal is made to the concept itself of God; and the claim 
is made that the existence of God is determined by that concept. It can, 
however, easily be seen that this happens ideally, not really. (Ak. 1:394) 
 
By showing how logicism (together with the assumption of divine necessity) 
implies ontotheism, Stang shows how Kant’s rejection of the latter implies a 
rejection of the former. It is then the task of the rest of Kant’s Modal 
Metaphysics to chart the fascinating contours and profound consequences of 
this rejection. What I want to focus on in these comments is the first step of 
that journey. 
 
The purpose of Stang’s account of the Leibnizian orthodoxy of logicism and 
ontotheism is to situate his interpretation of Kant’s famous claim that 
existence is not a real predicate. In particular, Stang wants to provide 
systematic support for his interpretation by explaining in detail how, so 
interpreted, the claim plays a central role in Kant’s rejection of the 
Leibnizian orthodoxy. To this end, Stang argues in §1.5 that logicism, via 
ontotheism, implies that existence is a real predicate. Hence Kant’s claim 
that existence is not a real predicate implies a rejection of the Leibnizian 
orthodoxy, both ontotheism as such and logicism as such. Kant will certainly 
have other objections to logicism (see Chapter 3), but this is the first and 
most fundamental. 
 
In the next two sections I explore Stang’s account of what is at issue in the 
question of whether or not existence is a real predicate. In §5 I turn to his 
argument that logicism, via ontotheism, implies that it is. 
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3. Possibilism and Actualism 
 
The claim that existence is a real predicate, on Stang’s interpretation, is the 
claim that it could apply to some objects and not to others (see §1.6, 
especially p.39 and p.42). Like the predicate ‘is a narwahl’, the predicate 
‘exists’ has the potential to divide a domain of objects into those that do and 
those that do not possess it – just as it is possible that some objects are 
narwahls and some are not, so it is possible that some objects exist and some 
do not. This is the view that Kant so famously rejects when he says that 
existence is not a real predicate. 
 
We can home in on the heart of the dispute, on Stang’s reading, if we note 
that possibility distributes over conjunction, so the view Kant rejects entails 
that it is possible that some objects exist and it is possible that some objects 
do not exist. Obviously Kant would not deny that it is possible that some 
objects exist. Rather what he objects to is the other conjunct, namely that it 
is possible that some objects do not exist. 
 
Stang calls the view that it is possible that some objects do not exist 
‘possibilism’ (§§1.5-1.6).6 In symbols, where E! is our object-level existence 
predicate, and for the moment reading the quantifier as neutrally as you 
can:7, 8 
 
(Possibilism) ◊∃x ¬E!x  
 
 
6 Again I think, at least at this stage, it is best not to think of Stang’s ‘possibilism’ (or his 
‘actualism’) as mapping directly onto similarly named the views in the contemporary 
literature. There is clearly supposed to be some fairly tight connection – unlike with Stang’s 
‘logicism’ – but as we shall see, part of what will be at issue in §6 is the extent to which this 
is settled. 
7 I will occasionally make trivial changes to Stang’s logical notation. 
8 Alternatively, and a little more carefully, we can reason as follows. Stang, in a similar vein 
to Van Cleve (1999: 188), oﬀers us the following definitions (p.39): ‘A concept P determines a 
concept C if and only if it is possible that there is an object that instantiates C and P and it 
is possible that there is an object that instantiates C but not P’; and ‘A predicate P is a 
determination if and only if P determines at least one concept’. Stang takes ‘determination’ 
and ‘real predicate’ to be synonymous (p.36 – see Bader (forthcoming) for discussion). 
Thus: 
E! determines C iﬀ ◊∃x (Cx & E!x) & ◊∃x (Cx & ¬E!x), so 
E! determines C only if ◊∃x (Cx & ¬E!x), so 
E! determines some concept only if ◊∃x ¬E!x, so 
E! is a real predicate only if ◊∃x ¬E!x, i.e. possibilism. 
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Possibilism is tantamount to the claim that existence is a real predicate, on 
Stang’s interpretation. Thus Kant’s claim that existence is not a real 
predicate is tantamount to the negation of possibilism. Assuming the 
standard duality of both the quantifiers and the operators, this results in 
what Stang calls ‘actualism’:9 
 
(Actualism) □∀x  E!x  
 
Actualism is the view that it is necessary that all objects exist. (Stang is 
careful to clarify: ‘this is not the claim that every object de re necessarily 
exists; it is merely the claim that, necessarily, the quantifier ‘for all’ ranges 
only over existing objects’ (p.32). I return to this distinction in §6). 
 
Note that, if we hold fixed the duality of the quantifiers, the diﬀerence 
between possibilism and actualism tracks whether or not the object-level 
existence predicate can be defined like so: 
 
(E!-Def.) E!x  =def. ∃y y=x  
 
Actualists can accept this definition. It makes the sentence inside the scope 
of the necessity operator in Actualism an uncontentious logical truth. By the 
same token, however, possibilists must reject it. It makes the sentence inside 
the scope of the possibility operator in Possibilism an equally uncontentious 
logical falsehood. Given E!-Def., Actualism would say that, necessarily, 
everything is something; while Possibilism would say that, possibly, 
something is nothing. (Note again, in parallel with Stang’s clarification from 
the previous parentheses, this is not the more plausible sounding de re 
contingentist claim that something is possibly nothing, i.e. that there is 
something that could nevertheless have failed to be something.) 
 
What we have here, then, is the widely acknowledged connection between 
Kant’s view of existence and our contemporary ‘existential’ quantifier.10 On 
a Fregean conception of that quantifier – as a second-order predicate, saying 
of concepts that they are instantiated – there is clear evidence for this 
connection. (And Frege himself eﬀectively cites Kant’s view in §53 of the 
Grundlagen.) In the Beweisgrund: 
 
 
9 The duality of the quantifiers is a stipulation (p.34n). For the duality of the operators, see 
Baumgarten’s Metaphysics §101, which Kant appears to follow without complaint. For 
instance, from notes to lectures given around 1790: ‘Necessary is that of which the opposite 
is impossible’ (Ak. 28:557). 
10 See, for example, Bennett (1974: 228ﬀ.), Van Cleve (1999: 189f.), Forgie (2000), Reed 
(2007: 169f.). For opposing views, see Rosefeldt (2008; 2011) and Rosenkoetter (2010). 
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Existence is not so much a predicate of the thing itself as of the thought 
which one has of the thing (Ak. 2:72) 
 
If I say, ‘God is an existent thing’, it looks as if I am expressing the relation 
of a predicate to a subject. But there is an impropriety in this expression. 
Strictly speaking, it should say, ‘Something existent is God’, that is, those 
predicates which, taken together, we designate by means of the expression 
‘God’ belong to an existent thing. (Ak. 2:74) 
 
And in the Critique: 
 
Now if I take the subject (God) together with all his predicates (among 
which omnipotence belongs) and say ‘God is’ or ‘there is a God’, then I add 
no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself 
with all of its predicates, and indeed posit the object in relation to my 
concept. (A599/B627) 
 
Interestingly, however, Stang insists that Kant is not merely claiming that 
existence is most fundamentally a (proto-Fregean) quantifier when he says it 
is not a real predicate. According to Stang, this cannot be the whole story. 
For in itself, the claim that existence is some such quantifier is entirely 
compatible with the claim that it is possible that some objects do not exist. 
Indeed, it is compatible with the claim that in fact some objects do not 
exist. If existence is merely a restricted quantifier, and so not defined as the 
dual of the universal quantifier, then to say that (possibly) some objects do 
not exist is just to say that (possibly) some objects do not fall within the 
domain of (restricted) existential quantification.11 
 
According to Stang, then, Kant is making the stronger, more specific claim 
that existence is an unrestricted quantifier: 
 
the real issue between the ontotheist and Kant over existence is not whether 
existence is a quantifier (second-order predicate) but whether it is a restricted 
or unrestricted quantifier. The real issue is whether there is an existence 
predicate for objects that applies only to a subset of them (equivalently, 
whether the existence quantifier is a restriction of the ‘there is’ quantifier); 
the ontotheist must maintain that the existence predicate for objects applies 
only to a subset of them. (p.39) 
 
 
11 Note that this is not to concede that possibilists could after all accept E!-Def. ‘∃’ is by 
stipulation the dual of ‘∀ ’ and so by stipulation not restricted (in the relevant sense). What 
they could do is introduce a new quantifier ‘∑’, a restricted counterpart of ‘∃’ which is not 
the dual of ‘∀ ’, and accept E!-Def.*: E!x =def. ∑ y  y=x. Thanks to Catharine Diehl for 
prompting clarification on this point. 
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Hence the primacy, on Stang’s account, of the domain-dividing conception 
of real predication and the attendant distinction between possibilism and 
actualism. 
 
We can put all of this together as follows. 
 
All concerned can accept that to be is to be the value of a (first-order) 
variable (bound by an unrestricted quantifier). That is, no one in Stang’s set-
up is denying that, necessarily, all objects are; that, necessarily, everything is 
something; □∀x ∃y (y=x) (see especially p.26). But only the actualist, 
accepting E!-Def., takes this to be equivalent to the claim that, necessarily, 
all objects exist. The possibilist, in claiming that possibly, some objects do 
not exist, must reject E!-Def. and thus maintain that there is, at least in 
principle, a distinction between being and existing, between being a 
something and being a something that is an existing object. 
 
Ignore the issue of impossible beings and call those things that would have 
being but no existence ‘mere possibilia’.12 According to Stang, the Leibnizian 
is committed to (at least the possibility of) mere possibilia, while Kant is not 
so committed and in fact rejects (even the possibility of) mere possibilia.13 
 
In §§5-6 I want to call into question both parts of this claim. First, however, 
an important clarification regarding the nature of possibilism, actualism, 
and the conception of an object that is in play in these views. 
 
4. Logical Actualism and Two Conceptions of Objects 
 
As noted above, Kant in the pre-Critical period is already in the process of 
distinguishing the logical from the metaphysical modalities and thus 
rejecting logicism. Stang is about to embark upon a thorough account of 
this process and much of what comes will involve carefully distinguishing 
diﬀerent modal notions. Yet we have just seen that, on Stang’s 
 
12 For the background to why we ignore impossible beings, see the Introduction, §1.2, and 
§6.6 – it concerns the Wollfian conception of ontology, or general metaphysics. 
13 I should note at this point that I am not altogether happy with the apparent iteration of 
possibility operators involved in Stang’s set-up, which we saw already in §1 when he 
characterizes the debate as one concerning whether there could be possibilia. Sometimes he 
drops it (p.33); sometimes he insists on it (p.34). On the one hand, I can understand the 
motivation for talking in terms of whether a predicate could divide a domain rather than in 
terms of whether it in fact does so. On the other hand, I find it diﬃcult to see what exactly 
is supposed to be weaker about committing to the possibility of there being mere possibilia 
as opposed to committing to there being mere possibilia. I suspect that the outer operator 
should be thought of as an epistemic modal. 
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interpretation, the claim that existence is not a real predicate is itself 
tantamount to a modal claim, namely actualism, the view that it is necessary 
that all objects exist. 
 
We should therefore ask: Which kind of necessity are we dealing with here? 
Correspondingly, which kind of possibility is involved in possibilism, the 
view that it is possible that some objects do not exist? (Or again, in the 
original terms of what this means as a view about predication: How are we 
to understand the modality in Stang’s interpretive claim that a real predicate 
is one that can divide a domain?) 
 
Stang is never fully explicit in posing or answering these questions, but his 
position is clear enough (see especially the summary that comes later, at 
p.148). 
 
Possibilism, for Stang, must be the view that it is logically possible that some 
objects do not exist. Otherwise, Stang’s argument that logicism (via 
ontotheism) implies possibilism would itself amount to a reductio of 
logicism. He would have argued that the view on which metaphysical 
possibility just is logical possibility implies that metaphysical possibility is 
something other than logical possibility. Such a reductio is very far from 
Stang’s intentions.  
 
To come at the same point from the other direction, Kant’s actualism, for 
Stang, must be the view that it is logically necessary that all objects exist. For 
on a conception of metaphysical necessity as distinct from logical necessity 
such that some metaphysical necessities are not also logical necessities, the 
view that it is metaphysically necessary that all objects exist would be 
entirely compatible with the view that it is logically possible that some 
objects do not exist – on such a conception, there are metaphysical 
impossibilities that remain logically possible. 
 
Of course, the logicists themselves wouldn’t distinguish the logical and 
metaphysical versions of possibilism or the logical and metaphysical versions 
of actualism, reducing metaphysical modality to logical modality as they do. 
And Kant, who would make such distinctions, may well also hold 
metaphysical actualism. But Stang wants to set up an opposition between 
Kant and his Leibnizian predecessors, and to do so without prejudging who 
is in the right – this only happens if we focus on the logical versions of the 
views. 
 
 12 
This means that possibilism can be glossed as the view that the proposition 
that some objects do not exist does not lead to a contradiction and actualism 
as the view that the same proposition does lead to a contradiction. On 
Stang’s reading, then, Kant’s claim that existence is not a predicate is 
tantamount to the claim that it is ultimately contradictory to say that some 
objects do not exist. It is not just that Kant is not committed to mere 
possibilia – the very idea of mere possibilia is incoherent, for Stang’s Kant. 
 
Now, the claim that Kant holds it to be logically necessary that all objects 
exist might sound suspicious to many readers. Consider: the correlate view 
that existence is not a real predicate of course survives into the Critical 
philosophy (the canonical expression is at A598/B626). In Critical 
terminology, then, we might think to express Kant’s alleged logical actualism 
as the claim that the concept <exists> is contained in the concept <object>, or 
otherwise put as the claim that ‘All objects exist’ is analytic, akin to ‘All 
bodies are extended’ (A7/B11). Both can seem mistaken. Indeed, they can 
seem to get Kant’s view precisely the wrong way round. 
 
Regarding the second formulation, Kant says that ‘every existential 
proposition is synthetic’ (A598/B626). Regarding the first, he says, for 
instance, that ‘one can, to be sure, call everything, and even every 
representation, insofar as one is conscious of it, an object’ (A189/B234). So 
surely even non-existents like unicorns still qualify as objects in some 
suitably Kantian sense of that term. In which case, how can <exists> be 
contained in <object>? 
 
To an extent these issues are superficial, but they do highlight some 
important points. 
 
To begin with, ‘All objects exist’ is not an existential proposition in Kant’s 
sense, so there is no immediate tension here. Kant makes clear earlier in the 
same paragraph that, when he says every existential proposition is synthetic, 
he is talking about propositions of the form ‘This or that thing… exists’ 
(A597/B625). These two kinds of proposition are quite diﬀerent. The former 
is general, the latter particular. Assuming E!-Def. from above – the quantifier 
definition of ‘exists’ – the former can be symbolized as ‘∀x ∃y y=x’, the latter 
as ‘∃y y=a’, where ‘a’ is some individual constant, ‘This or that thing’. Kant is 
saying that propositions of the latter form are synthetic, not the former.14 
 
 
14 Presumably, Kant also has in mind as synthetic and existential those propositions of the 
form ‘∃xFx ’ more generally, but this does not aﬀect the present point. Thanks to Ralf 
Bader for prompting clarification on this point. 
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Nevertheless, this isn’t quite the end of the matter. For if the former 
proposition were analytic, as Stang’s account suggests, and if it logically 
entailed the latter, which it does in standard predicate logic, then 
presumably the latter would be analytic, too – Kant would take analyticity 
to be closed under logical entailment. So we would after all have a tension 
with Kant’s claim that all existential propositions are synthetic. To avoid this 
result, then, Stang’s Kant must reject standard predicate logic. More on this 
in section §6. 
 
Regarding whether non-existents like unicorns qualify as objects in some 
suitably Kantian sense – they do, and in an absolutely central Kantian sense. 
They just don’t count as objects in the sense of ‘object’ involved in Kant’s 
actualism. 
 
Stang marks a fundamental distinction between Kant’s quantificational 
conception of an object and his representational (or intentional) conception 
of an object. The quantificational objects are ‘the objects there are’ (p.290) 
and it is only in the quantificational sense that Kant holds that all objects 
exist. Talk of objects in the representational sense is really ‘shorthand for talk 
of conceptual contents’ (p.170-1). And in this sense it is definitively not the 
case that all objects exist – this would be to say that all concepts are 
instantiated. 
 
This distinction plays a crucial role in Stang’s narrative (see the 
Introduction, §2.8, and especially §6.6 and the additional online paper, 
‘Kant and the Concept of an Object’). Stang finds it in Kant’s pre-Critical 
distinction between absolute and relative positing (e.g. at Ak. 2:73) and it is 
intricately related to the key Critical distinction between intuitions and 
concepts.15 Stang’s account here is as rich and complex as any in the book 
and I cannot engage with it properly in these comments. I merely want to 
say enough to pre-empt any misunderstanding of Stang’s position that 
might arise from my selective presentation of it. 
 
With the distinction between quantification and representational 
conceptions of objects in hand, any worry that the claim that all objects 
exist looks straightforwardly un-Kantian is defused. The claim is 
straightforwardly un-Kantian only when ‘object’ is taken in its 
 
15 Stang argues that ‘for every intuition there is an object of that intuition, which entails that 
the object of that intuition […] exists in the ‘absolute positing’ sense’ (p.163). The final 
qualification here is crucial. As Stang goes on to point out in a footnote, this makes his 
position somewhat orthogonal to the recent debate concerning whether intuition is object-
dependent. I try to clarify some related issues in Stephenson (2017). 
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representational sense. But in this sense, the claim would also be 
straightforwardly false. We have the concept <unicorn> but it is 
uninstantiated – no unicorns exist. This much is obvious, if unfortunate.16 
Whether or not one holds that all objects exist when ‘objects’ is taken in its 
quantificational sense is a diﬀerent question altogether. It is a question about 
whether or not one is ontologically committed to mere possibilia.17 
 
5. From Logicism (via Ontotheism) to Possibilism? 
 
In this section I turn to Stang’s argument that ontotheism implies 
possibilism. Recall the place of this argument in Stang’s dialectic. Logicism 
is the Leibnizian orthodoxy in modal metaphysics. Given the assumption of 
divine necessity – shared by all relevant parties – logicism implies 
ontotheism. So if ontotheism implies possibilism, so does logicism (for all 
relevant parties). And possibilism is tantamount to the claim that existence 
is a real predicate. The argument from ontotheism to possibilism is thus 
central to Stang’s account of Kant’s rejection of the Leibnizian logicist 
orthodoxy in modal metaphysics. 
 
I have two main points. First, in §5.1, I suggest that Stang’s argument trades 
on substantial logical commitments that he is yet to give us reason to think 
the Leibnizian shares. Second, in §5.2, I suggest that the argument can 
appear to prove too much. In particular, it can seem to apply to Kant 
himself. 
 
The purpose of both points is as much to raise a series of issues for 
discussion, issues that will come to prominence in the next section, where I 
suggest that Kant himself could be committed to mere possibilia. 
 
5.1 The Logic of Logicism 
 
The crux of Stang’s argument is that ontotheism (and thus logicism, given 
divine necessity) is committed to a claim that is eﬀectively incompatible 
with E!-Def. and thus actualism, i.e. the quantifier definition of existence 
 
16 At least it is obvious to ourselves and to Kant (see Ak 2.72). Perhaps it wasn’t obvious to 
Leibniz or the miners of Quedlinburg – see Stang’s whimsical and fascinating Preface. 
17 I take it that the distinction between the quantificational and representational conception 
of objects might also be able to play a role in explaining away Kant’s occasionally 
undeniably possibilist manner of speaking, for instance when he says ‘Who can deny that 
millions of things which do not actually exist are merely possible’ (2:72) and ‘A hundred 
actual thalers do not contain the least bit more than a hundred possible ones’ (A599/B627) 
– see Rosefeldt (2011) for discussion. 
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and the view that necessarily all objects exist. Since the negation of 
actualism is possibilism, the view that possibly some objects do not exist, 
this is an argument that ontotheism is committed to possibilism. 
 
I cite the argument more or less in full for the sake of perspicuity, because it 
is concise, and because I will discuss each part of it in due course:18 
 
Ontothesists hold that God necessarily exists in virtue of the fact that his 
existence is grounded in his essence. They are committed to the following in-
virtue-of claim: 
 
(1) (□God exists) in virtue of the fact that (God’s existence is 
grounded in his essence). 
 
This is an instance of the general principle that objects have predicates 
necessarily in virtue of those properties being logically grounded in their 
essences. That general principle entails that: 
 
 (2) a’s essence grounds a’s being F →  □Fa. 
 
In other words, any predicate grounded in an object’s essence is a predicate 
the object necessarily has. Furthermore, the consequent of this conditional 
obtains in virtue of the antecedent; the object in question necessarily has the 
predicate because (in virtue of the fact) that predicate is grounded in its 
essence. 
However, this conception of the relation between necessary predication 
and essence runs into problems if we make the assumption that necessarily 
every object exists, i.e. [Actualism] 
 
 (3) □∀xE!x .  
 
Note that this is not the claim that every object de re necessarily exists; it is 
merely the claim that, necessarily, the quantifier ‘for all’ ranges only over 
existing objects. It is an immediate consequence of the most natural way of 
defining the predicate ‘exists’ [i.e. E!-Def.] 
 
 (4) E!x  = ∃y y=x. 
 
[…] If we define ‘exists’ in this fashion, then the sentence inside the scope of 
the necessity operator in (3) is a logical truth; since logical truths are 
necessary, (3) is true. If we define the predicate ‘exists’ in this fashion, (2) 
entails: 
 
 (5) a’s essence grounds a’s being F →  □E!a .  
 
 
18 Recall that my logical notation diﬀers slightly (but trivially) from Stang’s – for the sake of 
readability I have built this in to the following quotation without making note of every case 
with square brackets. 
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[n. ‘Because □Fa entails that □∃y y=a, which, by (4), is equivalent to 
□E!a .’] In other words, any object with an essence suﬃcient to ground 
some of that object’s predicates is an object that necessarily exists. This 
entails that either no object other than God has essential properties, or that 
every object with essential predicates necessarily exists. Neither is an 
acceptable consequence. 
The ontotheist might try to escape this consequence by modifying (2) as 
follows: 
 
 (6) a’s essence grounds a’s being F →  □(E!a  →Fa). 
 
But notice that the consequent of this conditional is trivial where ‘exists’ 
replaces ‘F’: 
 
 (6*) a’s essence grounds a’s existence →  □(E!a  →E!a ). 
 
The triviality of this conditional undermines the ontotheist position […] If 
(6) is taken to be the meaning of (2), then every object necessarily exists in 
precisely the same sense that God necessarily exists: necessarily, if it exists, it 
exists. 
In order to counter these problems, the ontotheist needs to retreat to (2) 
and reject the principle that [necessarily] every object exists, [i.e. actualism]. 
(pp.31-33) 
 
The crux of this argument is the idea that those committed to (2) must 
reject E!-Def. and thereby actualism because combining (2) with E!-Def. 
leads to (5), which has unacceptable consequences (for all relevant parties). 
 
At first it can seem as though this doesn’t have much to do with ontotheism. 
After introducing ontotheism at (1), Stang immediately takes a step back to 
a more general principle, (2). But (2) looks logicist at best, rather than 
specifically ontotheist. And the step that takes us from (2) via E!-Def. to (5) 
trades on general and well-recognized logical phenomena. 
 
What is ingenious about Stang’s argument, however, and where ontotheism 
really plays a role, is in the observation that ontotheists cannot adopt one of 
the standard responses to that general and well-recognized phenomenon, 
namely to make necessary predication conditional on existence and thus 
replace (2) with (6). For doing so would yield (6*) as the meaning of (1), 
which cannot be what the ontotheists are after. Stang puts the problem with 
(6*) in terms of triviality. Another way to put the problem is simply that 
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(6*) does not say what the ontotheists want to say, namely that a being 
whose essence grounds its existence is a being whose existence is necessary.19 
 
Still,  it’s diﬃcult to  shake the impression that something other  than  either 
ontotheism or logicism is doing much of the important work in Stang’s 
argument. 
 
I have two candidates in mind. Stang mentions one of them: ‘The 
intermediate step – from □Fa to □∃y y=a – fails in a free logic’ (p.32n). He 
thinks this problem can be waived because ‘the ontotheist who adopts a free 
logic will still require a theory structurally isomorphic to [possibilism and its 
correlate rejection of E!-Def.]’ (p.32n). Stang might be right about this, and 
this is an opportunity for him to present his case. But it will be useful to be 
clear about what exactly is at stake here. 
 
On the one hand, universal (or inclusive) free logics are presumably oﬀ the 
table for the logicist ontotheist (at least if they want to avoid rejecting E!-
Def., which is the whole point of the current exercise). Logicist ontotheists 
take it to be a logical necessity that God exists, hence a logical necessity that 
something exists. If we align logical necessity and theoremhood and assume 
E!-Def., this is not the case in universal free logics. 
 
On the other hand, although strictly speaking Stang is right that the step 
from □Fa to □∃y y=a fails in a free logic, it is important to be clear that it 
does not fail in all free logics. In particular, it fails in positive free logics but 
not in negative free logics (regardless of whether or not they are universal).20 
In negative free logics, unlike in positive free logics, all atomic formulae 
involving terms that do not denote existents come out false. Thus whenever 
an atomic formula, such as Fa, is true, it will be the case that a exists – 
negative free logics can recover a rule of existential generalization for atomic 
formula.21 The issue is complicated ever so slightly by the presence of the 
necessity operators, but the general point stands – negative free logics can 
validate the step from □Fa to □∃y y=a. 
 
Stang’s burden is thus to show either that the Leibnizian cannot adopt a 
non-universal positive free logic or otherwise that doing so will still require a 
 
19 Thanks to Jessica Leech for this way of stating the problem, and also for putting me on to 
Kit Fine’s discussion of closely related issues (2005: 321ﬀ.; see especially p.332, where Fine 
also observes that the ontotheist cannot make the standard move). 
20 Nor does it fail in neutral free logics, but I put these aside as unavailable options in the 
present context since they require truth-value gaps. 
21 See Burge (1974: 312ﬀ.) – his axiom A9 – and Evans (1982: 73). 
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theory structurally isomorphic to possibilism and its correlate rejection of 
E!-Def. 
 
Regarding the second option, one thought here might be that providing a 
semantics for such a logic involves ontologicial commitment to something 
like mere possibilia – as the truth-makers for atomic formulae involving 
terms that do not denote existents, for instance. 
 
Aspects of each of the points I have made will be relevant in what follows 
and I will expand on several of them in §6.1. 
 
The second candidate I have in mind is quantified modal logic itself. To my 
mind, this issue is more serious. To begin with, note that it is notoriously 
easy to come by necessary existence in such a logic. As A. N. Prior (1957: 48) 
famously put it, ‘modal logic is haunted by the myth that whatever exists 
exists necessarily’. (Later on the same page, in a less famous line that is 
nevertheless especially pertinent here, he adds ‘which makes gods of us all’.) 
Might Stang’s argument be trading on this fact? 
 
Consider the following chain of reasoning. It employs moves not dissimilar 
to those employed in Stang’s argument, except that no appeal is made to (2) 
or anything at all that looks specifically logicist or ontotheist. And yet we get 
to a conclusion that is even stronger than (5) or anything (5) entails, namely 
that, given E!-Def., everything necessarily exists. The proof is surprisingly 
quick: 
 
 (7) ∃y y=x 
(8) □∃y y=x 
(9) ∀x □∃y y=x 
 
(7) is a theorem in standard predicate logic as well as in many non-universal 
free logics (i.e. those that allow free variables in their theorems). It is 
definitional of a ‘normal’ modal logic that it has a rule that allows us to take 
any theorem and necessitate on it to yield another theorem. Doing so yields 
(8). And we get (9) by applying the standard rule of universal generalization, 
which likewise allows us to universally generalize any theorem and preserve 
theoremhood. We seem to have used quite innocuous tools. But given E!-
Def. – if the existential quantifier expresses existence – (9) says that every 
object whatsoever necessarily exists. 
 
There are of course several diﬀerent measures one can take to avoid this kind 
of result. (7) is not a theorem in universal free logics, for instance, though 
we have seen that the Leibnizian might not be able to adopt such a logic. 
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Alternatively, we can construct our logic so as to deny theoremhood to any 
formula with free variables, including (7), in which case we can neither 
necessitate to get (8) nor universally generalize to get (9). 
 
On at least one natural construal of Stang’s argument, it necessitates on a 
formula containing a free variable, namely at line (4), or E!-Def.22 Stang 
might well be able to avoid this contentious move by more clearly 
distinguishing E!-Def. as an object-language formula and E!-Def. as a schema 
or meta-language stipulation. But in any case, banishing free variables from 
theorems is not suﬃcient to fix the problem. Consider:  
 
 (7*) ∃y y=a 
(8*) □∃y y=a 
(9)  ∀x □∃y y=x 
 
(7*) is a theorem in standard predicate logic and the rest is as before. 
 
Again, there are of course several diﬀerent measures one can take to avoid 
this kind of result, such as banishing individual constants from the 
language, restricting necessitation, or adopting a free logic (universal or 
otherwise, this time). But the point is made. Stang’s argument involves 
substantial logical commitments, commitments with which we need to be 
very careful if we are not going to overgenerate necessary existence, 
regardless of logicism or ontotheism. And we have not been given reason to 
think the Leibnizian must accept them. 
 
The deeper point is this. Couldn’t the Leibnizian simply reject quantified 
modal logic altogether? In particular, couldn’t they object to Stang’s 
introduction of modal operators? After all, logicism is the view that 
metaphysical modality is exhausted by logical modality. And it might seem 
that ordinary non-modal logic already has the resources for expressing logical 
possibility and logical necessity, namely in terms of logical consistency and 
logical truth respectively. It is really only the deniers of logicism that need 
fundamentally new resources, like modal operators, to express their claims, 
since it is they who think that there are extra-logical possibilities and 
necessities. 
 
As things stand, then, I do not think that Stang has shown that the logicist 
ontotheist must commit to possibilism and reject E!-Def. 
 
 
22 See the presentation of the argument in the additional online material, ‘Free Logic and 
Ontotheism’. 
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In §6 I will suggest that remarkably similar considerations concerning 
Kant’s own logical commitments can seem to show that Kant himself is 
ontologically committed to mere possibilia. 
 
Before that, I want to consider how Stang’s argument relates to Kant. For it 
is not immediately clear why Kant himself would not accept (2) and thus 
might himself be in danger of being captured by the argument. 
Investigation of this issue will be similarly instructive. 
 
5.2 Existence and Predication 
 
Let me restate the key principle for ease of reference: 
 
 (2) a’s essence grounds a’s being F →  □Fa 
 
Stang says that (2) is entailed by ‘the general principle that objects have 
predicates necessarily in virtue of those properties being logically grounded in 
their essences’ (p.31, my emphasis). This general principle looks specifically 
logicist. But why would (2) not likewise be entailed by the more general, not 
specifically logicist principle that objects have predicates necessarily if those 
properties are grounded in some way or other in their essences? After all, it 
seems that nothing represented in (2) has changed here. So if (2) is entailed 
by the old principle then it should also be entailed by the new one. And the 
new principle does not look at all specific to ontotheism or logicism. 
 
Many philosophers who want to reject ontotheism and who also want to 
distinguish the logical and metaphysical modalities might well accept that a 
predicate being grounded in an object’s essence materially implies the object 
having that predicate necessarily. In particular, Kant himself might well 
accept this. It is compatible with denying that existence is a predicate that 
can ever be grounded in an object’s essence and it is compatible with 
nevertheless conceding that some objects exist necessarily (albeit not in 
virtue of existence being grounded in their essences). Kant is not generally 
opposed to connecting essence and grounding to necessity.23 
 
It might be objected that this worry involves a deliberate misreading of (2). 
Stang was explicit that its main connective was supposed to represent an 
 
23 See Stang’s discussion of Kant’s Critical conception of nomic necessity in Chapter 8, 
especially the core definition he argues for: ‘It is nomically necessary that p if and only if p is 
grounded in the essences of actual empirical natural kinds’ (p.241, 254). Admittedly, the 
Critical context and the restricted nature of nomic necessity aﬀects the issue significantly, 
but the basic connection between essence, grounding, and necessity remains. 
 21 
explanatory in-virtue-of relation, not merely a relation of material 
implication. And it was at least implicit that the reference to grounding in 
the antecedent of (2) should be read as a reference to some specifically 
logicist conception of grounding. However, while it may well be true that 
Kant would reject the claim so interpreted, this would not resolve the 
present worry. For nothing in Stang’s argument relied on these features of 
(2). The issue is not whether we can find a reading of (2) that only the 
ontotheist and logicist accepts, but whether there is anything in such a 
reading on which the validity of the inference to (5) depends. If not, then 
Stang’s argument fails to target ontotheism (or logicism) specifically. Indeed, 
it looks in danger of proving too much and might even capture Kant. 
 
To resolve this issue, we might again point to the fact that it is only 
ontotheists who cannot replace (2) with (6). Since Kant is no ontotheist, he 
can avoid Stang’s argument in this way. 
 
Moreover, we could try to reinforce the legitimacy of attributing (6) rather 
than (2) to Kant. Let me restate the principle for ease of reference: 
 
 (6) a’s essence grounds a’s being F →  □(E!a →Fa) 
 
(6) makes existence a condition on predication. And we might think that 
this is precisely what is implied by Stang’s interpretation of Kant’s view of 
existence. If existence is a quantifier (on the second-order predicate 
conception), then we might think that to say that something exists is to say 
that a predicate is instantiated. In which case, it makes little sense to 
attribute predicates to anything other than existent objects – predication 
presupposes existence. And indeed, on Stang’s interpretation, whether or 
not there can be beings that have essences (and thus possess predicates) 
while lacking existence is precisely what is in dispute between Kant and the 
Leibnizians. As mentioned in §1, this is supposed to be just another way of 
putting what is at stake between possibilism – which answers in the 
aﬃrmative – and actualism – which answers in the negative. In 
contemporary terms, Stang’s Kant is not just an actualist but a serious 
actualist.24 
 
24 See Plantinga (1983: 11). Two complications. First, Rosefeldt (2011: 338n) cites evidence 
against attributing such a view to Kant: ‘The proposition ‘God is omnipotent’ must remain 
true even for someone who does not acknowledge the existence of God’ (Ak. 2:74). 
However, the sentence continues: ‘provided that he understands how I construe the concept 
of God’ (my emphasis). And in the previous paragraph: ‘If I say: ‘God is omnipotent’ all 
that is being thought is the logical relation between God and omnipotence’ (Ak. 2:74, my 
emphasis). Plausibly, then, Kant is not denying that object-predication presupposes 
existence but rather that conceptual relations do. 
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However, the question would still remain: Why should we think that Kant 
would chose precisely (6) as his way of expressing that aspect of his view? 
After all, if nothing can have an essence without existing, then the relevant 
object would have to exist for the antecedent of (2) to be true – an existence 
condition could be implicitly built into (2). And in any case, there are ways 
other than (6) to build in the existence condition more explicitly. For 
instance: 
 
 (2*)  a’s essence grounds a’s being F →  (E!a →□Fa) 
 
And 
 
 (2**)  E!a →  (a’s essence grounds a’s being F →□Fa) 
 
So, what distinguishes (6) from (2), (2*), and (2**)? Well one thing that 
distinguishes (6) is precisely its ability to avoid the kind of reasoning that 
Stang employs to get from (2) to the result that a exists necessarily if it has 
an essence (i.e. (5)). Specifically, (2*) and (2**) would still have the 
consequence that a exists necessarily if it has an essence and it exists.25 This 
is a little weaker than the previous result but hardly more acceptable (to any 
relevant party). (6) is the only one of the principles on oﬀer that avoids such 
problems.26 
                                                
  Second, the connection between a second-order predicate conception of existence and a 
general existence presupposition for predication is less tight than the preceding suggests – it 
depends on what kind of second-order predicate conception one adopts. Suppose the 
following: for a to exist is for the concept <being identical to a> to be instantiated (i.e. (7*). 
This is compatible with a positive free logic according to which Fa can be true without 
anything being identical to a and thus without a existing. On the one hand, this option 
could provide a way of reconciling Rosefeldt’s reading of the passage from the previous 
paragraph with the passages we saw in §3 that support attributing to Kant a second-order 
predicate conception of existence. On the other hand, it might be oﬀ the table as a 
plausible reading of Kant because of the kind of ‘haecceity’ concept it involves. In any case, 
it deserves more attention than I can give it here and to my knowledge is yet to be explored 
in the (Kant) literature. My thanks to Lee Walters for bringing it to my attention. 
25 Proofs. For (2*): Assume that a’s essence grounds a’s being F. Then by (2*), if a exists 
then necessarily a is F. And if necessarily a is F then necessarily a exists, by Stang’s original 
reasoning: ‘□Fa entails that □∃ y y=a, which, by [E!-Def.], is equivalent to □E!a’ (p.32n). 
Thus if a’s essence grounds a’s being F and a exists then necessarily a exists. 
For (2**): Assume that a exists. Then by (2**), if a’s essence grounds a’s being F then 
necessarily a is F. And if necessarily a is F then necessarily a exists, by Stang’s original 
reasoning. Thus if a exists and a’s essence grounds a’s being F then necessarily a exists. 
My thanks to Jessica Leech for pointing out the first of these to me. Generalizing to the 
second case is straightforward. 
26 It is no coincidence that (6) is also, as it were, ‘more’ de dicto than the other options – it 
is the only principle that has the modal operator range over a non-atomic formula. This is 
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The point is that thinking that Kant can avoid Stang’s argument because his 
view of existence suggests (6) specifically starts to look suspiciously ad hoc. 
And this only strengthens the previous suspicion that what is really doing 
the work in Stang’s argument is the logic rather than logicism or 
ontotheism. 
 
6. The Logic of Kant’s Actualism 
 
In this final section I want to call into question whether Stang’s Kant is 
really free of ontological commitment to mere possibilia. I do so by 
exploring two substantive logical commitments that Stang’s interpretation 
implicitly imposes on Kant, suggesting that each can seem to involve a 
commitment to mere possibilia. 
 
What I point to are complex and on-going debates in contemporary 
philosophical logic and modal metaphysics and I cannot hope to settle them 
here. I hope merely to say enough to highlight their relevance and prompt 
further discussion. 
 
The logical commitments implicit in Stang’s account arise from combining 
Kant’s (serious, logical) actualism with certain other views that Kant holds, 
namely that it is logically possible that nothing exists and that it is not the 
case that everything enjoys necessary existence. In §6.1 I argue that 
combining actualism with the first of these claims requires a universal (or 
inclusive) free logic. In §6.2 I argue that combining actualism with the 
second claim requires rejecting the Converse Barcan Formula, which, 
informally, says that if it is necessary that everything satisfies a condition 
then everything necessarily satisfies the condition. 
 
The problem with both of these results can be illustrated by looking at the 
semantics. For a universal free logic, we can consider a dual-domain 
semantics. For a quantified modal logic that invalidates the Converse Barcan 
Formula, the standard route is a variable-domain semantics. This all sounds 
rather technical but it is not. The basic idea roughly put is just that, in 
having more than one domain – that is, in positing domains of objects 
beyond the domain of existing objects in order to make sense of their claims 
– committing to these logics with these semantics would appear to involve 
commitment to entities other than existing objects, namely mere possibilia. 
                                                
connected to the issues that were raised in the previous subsection and which will be 
relevant again in the next section. 
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The same worry can also be expressed in terms of quantifier restriction. We 
saw at the end of §3 how Stang connected Kant’s supposed eschewal of mere 
possibilia to the view that existence is not just a quantifier but an 
unrestricted quantifier. In these terms, the idea is as follows. While the 
logics in question do not themselves involve quantifiers ranging over 
anything other than existing objects, the meta-languages employ quantifiers 
that do precisely that. This amounts to an implicit restriction of the object-
language quantifiers. 
 
And to bring these two descriptions of the worry together. If our object-
language quantifiers range over all and only existing objects and yet are 
restrictions of our meta-language quantifiers, then our meta-language is 
involved in quantification over something other than existing objects, 
namely mere possibilia, and this might be thought to suﬃce for ontological 
commitment to such entities. 
 
Both aspects of this proposal might initially seem rather odd. 
 
Regarding the free logic: Isn’t the whole point of such logics to be free of the 
existence assumptions borne by standard predicate logic? Regarding a 
quantified modal logic that invalidates the Converse Barcan Formula: 
Hasn’t such a logic traditionally been attractive to contemporary actualists 
precisely because it avoids ontological commitment to mere possibilia? 
 
In the first case, the suggestion is that free logics avoid overtly committing 
to existing objects only by covertly committing to mere possibilia. 
Regarding the second case, the suggestion is that the traditional approach is 
mistaken. 
 
6.1 Universal Free Logic 
 
Standard predicate logic assumes both that all singular terms denote objects 
in the domain of quantification and that the domain of quantification is 
non-empty. On the standard interpretation of the quantifiers as ranging 
over existing objects – or, equivalently, the account of ‘existing as being’ 
which is embodied in E!-Def. – these amount to existence assumptions, 
namely that all singular terms denote existing objects and that something 
exists. 
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Note that the assumptions themselves are part of the formal structure of 
standard predicate logic. What turns them into existence assumption is the 
standard interpretation of that structure (or E!-Def.).27 
 
Universal free logics are designed to retain the standard interpretation of the 
quantifiers as ranging over existing objects without thereby making either of 
those existence assumptions. Hence they must adapt their formal structure 
accordingly. First, they allow that singular terms need not denote objects in 
the domain of quantification – i.e., given their standard interpretation of 
what populates that domain, they allow that singular terms need not denote 
existing objects. This step is what makes the logic free. Second, they allow 
the domain of quantification to be empty – i.e., given their standard 
interpretation of what populates that domain, they allow for nothing to 
exist. This step is what makes the logic universally free. 
 
Universal free logics are weaker than standard predicate logic (and non-
universal free logics). In particular, no existential proposition is a logical 
truth on a universal free logic. Such a logic thus seems extremely apt for 
capturing Kant’s views about logic. 
 
It is important to be clear, however, that it is not thereby trivial to attribute 
a universal free logic to Kant. What I mean is this. It is fairly clear that Kant 
would not want his logic to make existence assumptions. This is part of the 
Critical doctrine of the formality of pure general logic (A55ﬀ./B79ﬀ.).28 And 
in the pre-Critical period Kant says, for instance, ‘There is no inner 
contradiction in the negation of all existence’ (Ak. 2:78).29 That is, he clearly 
thinks that is logically possible that nothing exists and thus that it is not a 
logical truth that something exists, contra standard predicate logic (and non-
universal free logic).30 
 
But in itself, wanting logic to be free of existence assumptions is not enough 
to commit Kant to a universal free logic on the above, technical conception, 
where such a logic rejects the assumptions that all singular terms denote 
objects in a non-empty quantificational domain. For as we saw, these 
assumptions only amount to existence assumptions on the standard 
 
27 This distinction was already implicit at the end of §3. 
28 See MacFarlane (2002) and Lapointe (2012) for discussion. 
29 It is Kant’s talk of ‘inner contradiction’ that signals he is talking about a logical modality 
here. When, on the next page, he goes on to argue that ‘it is absolutely impossible that 
nothing at all should exist’ (Ak. 2:79), he is talking about a metaphysical (or real) modality. 
(See Chapter 5 for detailed discussion of Kant’s argument.) 
30 See pp.74-77 for Stang’s discussion of these matters. He doesn’t mention free logic, 
perhaps because he has in mind the point I make in the next paragraph. 
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interpretation of the quantifiers as ranging over existing objects, or E!-Def. 
And none of the points in the previous paragraph makes Kant beholden to 
such an interpretation. 
 
This is where Stang’s interpretation comes in. First, by taking Kant to be 
committed to E!-Def. But also, and in a way more fundamentally, by taking 
Kant to be committed to logical actualism. For regardless of the 
interpretation of the quantifiers, the actualist claim that everything in the 
domain of quantification exists entails that something exists if the domain 
must be non-empty. So if the claim that everything in the domain of 
quantification exists is supposed to be a logical truth, as we saw in §4 it is on 
Stang’s account, this would mean that it must also be a logical truth that 
something exists. This is why, on Stang’s reading, Kant must be committed 
to a logic that allows for the domain of quantification to be empty, i.e., a 
universal free logic.31 
 
In other words, Kant could well accept the formal structure of standard 
predicate logic while keeping logic free of existence assumptions, so long as 
he rejected both E!-Def. and actualism. He might, for instance, insist on a 
distinction between being and existence and claim that the quantifiers range 
over beings in general, only a proper subset of which are the existing beings. 
Again, then, the claim that Kant rejects such a view is a feature of Stang’s 
interpretation. It is not obvious simply from the fact that Kant thinks logic 
should be free of existence assumptions.32 
 
Why, then, is this significant? Why might it be a problem for Stang’s 
account that his interpretation commits Kant to a universal free logic in this 
way? 
 
James Van Cleve (1997: 197) argues that, ‘if we adopt a free logic we depart 
at least from the spirit of the Kant-Frege view [of existence]’. Van Cleve’s 
account of real predication and the issues it raises is in many respects similar 
to Stang’s own, so this would be an interesting development. In fact I think 
 
31 More or less the same result can be reached via Kant’s claim that no existential 
proposition is analytic – see §4. 
32 Stang says (p.68n) that his interpretation of Kant’s views on existence are ‘diametrically 
opposed’ to Rosefeldt’s Meinongian reading – see Rosefeldt (2008) and (2011). We have 
seen some aspects of this already. But in a way what I now go on to suggest is that there 
might be more room for reconciliation here than Stang thinks. Or alternatively, that it 
might not be altogether clear what is philosophically at stake between these two 
interpretations of Kant’s position. 
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that Van Cleve is wrong about this, and before I turn to my own point, it 
will useful to explain why. He says: 
 
Free logic places a companion restriction on the rule of existential 
generalization, requiring ‘E!a’ as an auxiliary premise before one can get 
from ‘Fa’ to ‘∃xFx’, and that requirement has point only on the assumption 
that a can instantiate the property of being F even if a does not exist. How 
can that assumption be true if, as on the Kant-Frege view, asserting existence 
and asserting the instantiation of a property go hand in hand? (1999: 197 – I 
have made trivial changes to the notation) 
 
Very similar points about the consequences of Kant’s view of existence for 
predication were raised in §5.2. But Van Cleve’s mobilization of them here 
rests on a mistake. 
 
Free logics per se make no such assumption ‘that a can instantiate the 
property of being F even if a does not exist’. Only positive free logics allow 
atomic formulae to come out true that involve singular terms that do not 
denote existing objects. Negative free logic require all such formulae to be 
false. Informally, negative free logics only allow existing objects to 
instantiate properties. And as we saw in §5.2, this is something the Kant-
Frege view of existence can be taken to suggest. At best, Van Cleve’s point 
shows that Kant would not accept a positive free logic.33 
 
We might then ask, what is the point of restricting the rule of existential 
generalization in negative free logics? The answer traces back to the reason 
free logics restrict the rule of universal instantiation. This restriction is more 
basic to free logic and has nothing to do with allowing anything other than 
existing objects to instantiate properties. That is, all free logics require an 
auxiliary premise of the form ‘a is something (existent)’ in order to validate 
moves from ‘everything (existent) is F’ to ‘a is F’. This requirement ‘has 
point’ because, without it, ‘a’ might fail to denote something existent, and 
so a might fail to be F even when everything existent is F – this is a 
requirement that holds across both positive and negative free logics and it 
involves no suggestion that non-existents can instantiate properties, merely 
that singular terms like ‘a’ might fail to denote existents. And crucially, from 
this restriction on universal instantiation, the restriction on existential 
generalization follows as a purely formal requirement on maintaining the 
duality of the quantifiers. For the duality of the quantifiers makes the two 
rules equivalent. 
 
33 Whether Van Cleve’s point even shows this much is complicated by the issue discussed in 
note 24 above, but note that if it did, Kant would not be able to take the free logic route – 
mooted in §5.1 – to invalidating Stang’s master argument to possibilism. 
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Contra Van Cleve, then, free logic’s general restriction of existential 
generalization ‘has point’ independently of any assumption ‘that a can 
instantiate the property of being F even if a does not exist’. Thus negative 
free logic can recover something stronger via other considerations that are 
precisely in line with the Kant-Frege view, namely a classical rule for atomic 
formulae. Van Cleve’s objection to attributing any form of free logic to Kant 
does not go through. And in fact, in itself, I take it that the attribution to 
Kant of a negative universal free logic is both highly plausible and somewhat 
underappreciated. So far so good for this (implicit) feature of Stang’s 
account.34 
 
What, then, is the problem? 
 
My own point holds only as an objection to Stang’s proposal that Kant is 
free of commitment to mere possibilia, and implicitly that this commitment 
is therefore a good place to draw the most fundamental line between Kant 
and his Leibnizian predecessors. 
 
I begin by putting the thought in very general terms before explaining the 
same idea in slightly more specific model-theoretic terms. 
 
The standard semantics for standard predicate logic assigns objects as the 
semantic values of singular terms. All such objects are thought of as existing 
objects, given the standard interpretation of the quantifiers. And so long as 
we are not worrying about singular terms that do not denote existing 
objects, this is fine. But what to do when we do start worrying about 
allowing singular terms that do not denote existing objects? 
 
One straightforward option is to retain the general idea that the semantic 
values of singular terms are objects, but to start allowing singular terms to 
have objects other than those in the domain of quantification as their 
semantic values. And given the standard interpretation of the quantifiers as 
ranging over existing objects, this is to allow objects other than the existing 
 
34 Another natural but mistaken objection would be that free logics often employ Russell’s 
primitive first-order existence predicate, E!, for instance in restricting their inference rules in 
the ways we have just seen that they do. Such a primitive first-order existence predicate 
would seem even more against ‘the spirit of the Kant-Frege view’. But such predicates are 
dispensable – so long as we have bivalence and identity, they can be defined away in terms 
of the existential quantifier, as with E!-Def. (though there are also other options). See 
Lambert (1967) for useful discussion. 
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ones to be the semantic values of singular terms. Whence mere possibilia, or 
rather something very like them, namely non-existent objects. 
 
Now the same basic idea in model-theoretic terms.35 One straightforward 
way to construct a model-theoretic semantics for universal free logic is to 
add a second, ‘outer’ domain to the standard single-domain model-theoretic 
semantics for predicate logic. We retain the original domain – now thought 
of as the ‘inner’ domain – and while either domain may be empty, their 
union must not be empty. The domains have no member in common (since 
this would interfere with valuation). We then modify the interpretation 
function, variable assignment function, and valuation function accordingly 
(with details depending on whether we want sentences involving members 
of the outer domain to come out all false, some true, or all neither true nor 
false – if Van Cleve and Stang are right about existence and predication, we 
want them all to come out false in this case). 
 
The important point is this. Our quantifiers still only range over the original 
– now inner – domain. And since we retain the old informal interpretation 
of our quantifiers as ranging over existing objects, we think of the members 
of the inner domain as the existing objects. This is as before. Except that 
now it is natural to think of the members of the outer domain as the non-
existent objects. Whence mere possibilia, or something very like them. 
 
Now, to an extent, this is just model-theory, and as far as the mathematics 
goes, the members of the sets that are our domains can be any old things we 
want. But consider that our intended model is presumably one that puts all 
(and only) the existing things in the inner domain – our quantifiers are 
meant to range over everything there is, everything that exists (and nothing 
else). And the inner and outer domains cannot have members in common. 
So, in our intended model – i.e., when our formal notion of truth in a model 
is supposed to track our informal notion of truth simpliciter – the only 
things left to populate the outer domain will be non-existent things. 
 
Of course this is all very rough and tentative and the issue is extremely 
complicated – my point is just that in this respect it remains to be settled 
what exactly Kant’s ontological commitments are. We might try to avoid the 
issue by adopting a general anti-realist stance towards our semantics, by 
refusing to take our semantics so seriously. Or we might provide an 
alternative semantics. Most interesting, to my mind, would to be explore 
whether it is more amenable to the Kantian framework to eschew objectual 
 
35 See Sider (2010: 129-32) for details. 
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semantics altogether, perhaps providing an intensional account of 
quantification in terms of individual concepts36 or adopting an approach 
that gives truth-theory primacy over model-theory.37 It is not clear how well 
this would fit with Stang’s general set-up, or how it relates to Kant’s views 
about individual concepts (A571/B599ﬀ.; Ak. 9:91, 102) and truth as 
correspondence (A58-9/B83-4). But perhaps something like this is the real 
lesson of Kant’s point about the formality of pure general logic. 
 
6.2 Quantified Modal Logic 
 
For ease of reference let me restate Kant’s actualism: 
 
(Actualism) □∀xE!x  
 
Recall that Stang is careful to clarify: ‘this is not the claim that every object 
de re necessarily exists; it is merely the claim that, necessarily, the quantifier 
‘for all’ ranges only over existing objects’ (p.32). To have a label, let us call 
that de re claim ‘necessitism’, and for clarity about what the diﬀerence is, let 
us state it in symbols: 
 
(Necessitism) ∀x□E!x  
 
Necessitism says that everything necessarily exists. Maintaining the 
distinction between actualism and necessitism is crucial for Stang, for while 
he attributes actualism to Kant, he thinks it is obvious that all relevant 
parties, including Kant, would reject necessitism (p.32). 
 
Now, however, consider the so-called ‘Converse Barcan Formula’: 
 
(CBF)  □∀x ϕ→∀x □ϕ  
 
Informally, if necessarily everything satisfies a condition then everything 
necessarily satisfies that condition. CBF would allow us to derive necessitism 
directly from actualism, for the special case where the condition in question 
is existence. Stang’s Kant must reject CBF.38 
 
 
36 See Garson (2006: 242ﬀ., 286ﬀ.) and Howell (1973), both particularly relevant given the 
topic of the next subsection. 
37 See Burge (1974) and Sainsbury (2005: 64ﬀ.). 
38 See Barcan (1943). Since CBF and its converse, the Barcan Formula, generally come 
together, it is therefore entirely fitting that Stang invokes an instance of the latter in his 
reconstruction of Baumgarten’s ontological argument (p.60) – the Leibnizians accept the 
principles while Kant rejects them. 
 31 
At this point even the reader who is still with me after the preceding 
subsection might be forgiven for finally crying ‘anachronism’. I think that 
would still be premature. The Barcan schemas connect the de re and de dicto 
modalities is a systematic way. To reaﬃrm the methodological point made 
in §1, this is a distinction that Kant and the Leibnizians could make perfect 
sense of. Indeed, it is a distinction that Kant insists upon maintaining in 
exactly the kind of context we have been occupied with in these comments, 
namely in his discussion of ontotheism: 
 
All the alleged examples [of absolute, unconditioned necessity] are, without 
exception, taken only from judgments, not from things and their existence. 
The unconditioned necessity of judgments, however, is not an absolute 
necessity of things. (A593/B621) 
 
To my mind, it is not too much of a leap to read the last sentence as an 
explicit rejection of exactly the kind of de re-de dicto connection encoded in 
CBF. 
 
Again, then, I take it that, in itself, the attribution to Kant of a rejection of 
CBF is quite plausible. And again, note that this is a particular feature of 
Stang’s interpretation – Kant could well accept CBF so long as he rejected 
E!-Def. and actualism. 
 
So what is the problem? 
 
My worry is the same as before. Rejecting CBF can seem to involve 
ontological commitment to mere possibilia. This time I approach the issue 
slightly diﬀerently. 
 
CBF is a feature of what is generally considered to be the simplest system of 
quantified modal logic. One reason the system is regarded as simple is that it 
posits only a single, fixed domain of quantification. Accordingly, one way to 
avoid CBF is to adopt a variable-domain semantics for quantified modal 
logic.39 However, adopting a variable-domain semantics in this way can look 
 
39 The canonical treatment is Kripke (1963), though it is worth noting that Stang’s Kant 
could not accept exactly Kripke’s semantics, since it eﬀectively severs the connection 
between existence and predication – see §§5.2-6.1. 
Interestingly, a variable-domain semantics that abides by an existence-presupposition for 
predication (and is bivalent) will naturally distinguish between wide and narrow scope 
negation, or sentence and predicate negation, which looks a lot like Kant’s distinction 
between negative and infinite judgment (A71-2/B97 – see p.64 and Stang (2012) for 
discussion). Consider a world whose domain lacks some individual a. Then (to use Stang’s 
notation) both Fa and (~Fa) will be false (where ~F is the property of being non-F), while 
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tantamount to placing restrictions on our quantifiers. Yet on Stang’s 
interpretation, Kant’s doctrine that existence is not a predicate was supposed 
to be tantamount to the claim that existence is an unrestricted quantifier. 
 
On the simplest, fixed domain approach to quantified modal logic, which 
validates CBF, a sentence like Actualism is straightforwardly about all objects 
whatever. And thus Actualism in particular says straightforwardly that it is 
necessary that all objects exist, where ‘all’ is read unrestrictedly. On a 
variable-domain approach that invalidates CBF, however, the domain of 
quantification is restricted by the context of evaluation. A sentence such as 
‘∀xE!x ’ would say something like: all objects at the world of utterance exist 
at that world. And Actualism says that, for each world accessible from the 
world of utterance, it is the case that all objects at that world exist at that 
world.40 
 
It is true that, if we adopt S5,41 this last claim turns out extensionally 
equivalent to saying straightforwardly that all objects whatever exist – in S5 
there is no extensional diﬀerence between talking about all worlds accessible 
from the world of utterance and taking about all worlds simpliciter, thus 
talking about all objects (restrictedly) at all worlds (unrestrictedly) amounts 
to talking about all objects (unrestrictedly). However, this eﬀective 
derestriction is due to the necessity operator, by its determination of which 
worlds and therefore which objects we are to take into account, by its 
eﬀectively quantificational interpretation in the model-theoretic semantics. 
The object-language universal and existential quantifiers themselves remain 
restricted, each limited to a single world. 
                                                
¬ (Fa) will be true (because Fa is false). See Stalnaker (1977) and Williamson (2013a: 122f., 
144ﬀ.) for useful discussion. 
As was already hinted at in §5.1 (when it was noted that (7) is not a theorem of universal 
free logics, with (9) being closely related to CBF), there is also a related, though more 
complex and disputed connection between free logics and quantified modal logics that 
invalidate CBF. (See Garson (2006: 228ﬀ.), and for discussion of this issue alongside a 
number of the other issues that have arisen in the course of these comments, see Fine (1978: 
144), Fine (1981), and Salmon (1987).) 
As I mentioned in §1, Stang’s Kant is looking remarkably coherent and sophisticated, 
even by today’s lights. 
40 See Bennett (2005) for discussion. 
41 See p.127 and p.134, where Stang attributes to Kant the characteristic axiom schema of S5 
– that possibly ϕ  entails necessarily possibly ϕ . The direct evidence he cites is certainly 
suggestive (Ak. 2:85; Ak. 17:252; cf. Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, §§101-109, where there are 
several suggestions of a similar view). Stang also notes that to deny S5 would be to allow 
that something could be possible while possibly being impossible, which would not sit at all 
well with the view Kant develops in the pre-Critical period according to which all 
(metaphysical) possibility is grounded in something absolutely (metaphysically) necessary. 
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Now, it is for reasons related to the issues I have just outlined that systems 
of quantified modal logic that validate CBF are often thought of as 
‘possibilist’ in the contemporary literature – their object-language 
quantifiers range over all objects whatever, supposedly including mere 
possibilia – whereas those systems that invalidate CBF are often thought of 
as ‘actualist’ in the contemporary literature – their object-language 
quantifiers range only over what is actual (though what is actual varies). So 
again we might ask: What is the problem here? 
 
Correspondingly, Stang’s central interpretive claim was really only ever that, 
for Kant, existence is no more restricted than the object-language universal 
quantifier. This, after all, is just what the Leibnizian ontotheist-logicist 
orthodoxy is denying, on Stang’s reading: 
 
the ontotheist needs to… claim that existence is not equivalent to falling 
within the scope of the universal quantifier (more precisely, being the value 
of a variable bound by the universal quantifier). The ontotheist needs to 
understand ‘exists’ as a predicate that (potentially) applies only to a subset of 
the objects that fall within the domain of the universal quantifier. (p.34) 
 
That Kant must reject CBF and so apparently allow that the object-language 
quantifiers are themselves both equally restricted does not touch this point. 
 
The problem, however, concerns what we are to make of the quantification 
implicit in the meta-language of a variable-domain approach to quantified 
modal logic. Is it really enough to avoid ontological commitment to mere 
possibilia that one’s object-language quantifiers range only over what is 
actual? Is no ontological commitment borne by the meta-language?42 
 
This is connected to a familiar debate. Just what are those non-actual 
possible worlds and their inhabitants typically invoked in a variable-domain 
semantics? As Barcan Marcus herself put it, with suggestive emphasis, ‘the 
semantics accommodates possibilia’ (1985: 197). It is an issue that Stang 
touches on. Occasionally what he says suggests that he takes commitment to 
possible worlds to suﬃce for possibilism. For instance: 
 
It is important to point out that the ontotheist does not need to claim there 
are non-existent objects, but only that such objects are possible; however, for 
many of the ontotheists considered here, their other philosophical 
 
42 See Linsky and Zalta (1994: 439ﬀ.), Williamson (1998: 263), and Williamson (2000: 206) 
for similar ways of putting the problem, and see Williamson (2013b) for more general 
discussion. 
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commitments may push them to accept non-existent possible objects (e.g. 
Leibniz’s possible worlds). (p.34) 
 
But how is this diﬀerent from the commitments that we have just seen that 
Kant seems to have? 
 
Later, and quite correctly, Stang points out that there is a distinction 
between the Kantian conception of a world as ‘a collection of substances 
unified by mutual causal interaction’ and the technical notion of a world as 
‘a modal index, an element in a model theory for modal logic’ (p.137). But is 
that really all that possible worlds amount to on a variable-domains 
approach? Model-theory has proven an extraordinarily useful tool for 
precisfying and cataloging the structure of relations between modal 
statements. But modal metaphysics is about the metaphysical underpinnings 
of modal statements. To connect the two, we need to give meaning to the 
model-theory. So the question is this: What, according to Stang’s Kant, 
metaphysically underpins the failure of CBF? 
 
Stang continues, ‘neither possible worlds as modal indices, nor possible 
worlds as truth-makers of modal sentences, will play any role in my 
argument’ (p.138). I have not disputed this. But I have suggested that such 
considerations arise quite naturally when, as Stang’s Kant must, we 
distinguish actualism from necessitism. And I have suggested that they can 
seem to commit Stang’s Kant to mere possibilia. 
 
As before, this is all very rough and tentative and the issue is extremely 
complicated – my point is just that in this respect it remains to be settled 
what exactly Kant’s ontological commitments are. We might try to avoid 
such problems by adopting an Ersatz approach to possible worlds (to 
employ Lewis’s appropriately Germanic metaphor).43 Relatedly, and to my 
mind most interestingly, we might explore the possibility of an altogether 
non-objectual semantics.44 Both CBF and possible worlds model-theory as a 
genuine theory of meaning can seem to suggest a certain primacy for the de 
re; they can seem suggestive of the idea that general, de dicto modal facts are 
grounded in particular facts concerning individuals. Perhaps the need for an 
alternative approach remains the real lesson of Kant’s Critical turn. But this 
 
43 See Lewis (1986: 136ﬀ.). For a useful, more recent discussion, see Sider (2002). 
44 See again Garson (2006: 242ﬀ., 286ﬀ.). For an early non-objectual Ersatz approach that 
we might expect to be suitably Kantian, see Carnap (1947). For criticism and relevant 
discussion, see Williamson (2013a: 46ﬀ., 203ﬀ.). For a much broader discussion, which I 
take to have something like this idea in the background, see Baldwin (2002). 
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is the topic of the second half of Kant’s Modal Metaphysics, and I must leave 
discussion of that for another occasion.45 
 
  
 
45 My thanks to Ralf Bader, Catharine Diehl, Nora Kreft, Guido Kreis, Jessica Leech, 
Christian Onof, Karl Schafer, and Lee Walters for comments on earlier drafts of this paper, 
as well as to Philipp Blum, Anil Gomes, Mike Martin, and Tobias Rosefeldt for discussion 
of related material at a workshop on the Metaphysics of Appearances in Ligerz, Switzerland. 
I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme Trust. 
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